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2ABSTRACT
The United States and the European Union have taken very different approaches in 
dealing with tender offers, especially in respect to the amount of power the board of directors has 
to block an unwanted takeover attempt.  The United States has no single set of guiding principles 
regarding most of substantive corporate law and the field of tender offers is no different.  The 
European Union, on the other hand, has very recently passed legislation that not only attempts to 
harmonize the corporate takeover laws of all its member states, but seeks to restrict the power of 
the board of directors.  The European Union passed the 13th Directive on Takeovers after much 
debate and previous failure.  Although the European Union required its member states to 
implement this legislation by May of 2006, only a handful of nations have actually met this goal, 
leaving the true effectiveness of this harmonization effort in doubt.  This paper analyzes not only 
these different approaches of regulating corporate takeovers and the tender offer process, but also 
explores alternative theories of governance in order to better understand how we got to where we 
are and to best predict where we are headed in the future. 
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I. INTRODUCTION 
 
4Perspective defines corporate reality, at least it does when looking at the respective 
powers of the board of directors and shareholders in hostile tender offers.  Europe and the United 
States view takeover law and hostile takeovers from entirely different perspectives, which has 
lead to divergent laws and corporate powers.  Corporate law in the U.S. is state law.1 True to 
federalist principles and competitive roots, each state has its own set of corporate laws, enacted 
to draw corporations to incorporate in its state.  In this battle for business, Delaware has emerged 
the current winner and is the focus of the majority of corporate law studies.  Importantly, in this 
struggle for corporate business, the grand effect has been to increase the power of the corporate 
boards of directors, especially in the realm of defenses to hostile takeovers.2
The European Union, on the other hand, has brought sovereign nations together and 
focused on the harmonization of national laws.3 True to this effort to harmonize, the E.U. has 
focused on defining a single set of underlying principles to guide its members when writing 
takeover law in their own countries.  It is not a battling system of laws, but a unified set of core 
values which the states will use to legislate from.  This system seeks not only to create a 
balanced playing field for shareholders, but it rejects the U.S. precedent of nearly unrestricted 
board power to defend against a hostile takeover.  However, because the E.U.’s Takeover 
Directive is only in its infancy, it is yet to be seen whether or not its implementation will match 
its goals to reality.  
 
The Tender Offer and the Defense: What are we talking about? 
 
1 Christin Forstinger, Takeover Law in the EU and the USA, 17 (2002). 
2 See Harry Hutchinson, Director Primacy and Corporate Governance: Shareholder Voting Rights Captured by the 
Accountability/Authority Paradigm, 36 Loy. U. Chi. L.J. 1111, 1149 (2005). See Also: Lucian Bebchuck, “A New 
Approach to Takeover Law and Regulatory Competition,” 87 Va. L. Rev. 111, 132 (2001) 
3 See Forstinger, supra note 1, at 48. 
5Essentially, a tender offer is an offer to the shareholders of a corporation to buy a 
specified number of shares (have the shareholders “tender” their shares) for a premium value.4
These offers are open for a specified period of time and usually require that a minimum number 
of shares be tendered for the purchase to go through.  Although originating as a way for the 
corporation to buy back its stock, it has developed into a powerful corporate takeover tactic,5
which has led to a heated debate regarding the proper powers and roles of the board of directors 
and the shareholders in a transaction that will cause a change of control. 
 Tender offers, as discussed here, are hostile efforts to takeover a company.  Boards of 
Directors have fought against these hostile tender offers by effectuating a variety of defensive 
measures including selling off assets, making a counter bid for the hostile acquirer (Pac-Man 
Defense), and seeking out a more attractive acquirer (White Knight).  We will focus here on the 
most effective and debated defensive weapon, the “shareholder rights plan”, also lovingly known 
as the “poison pill.”6
The poison pill refers to a variety of board measures, the most popular being the “flip-in” 
measure which gives the shareholders the ability to redeem an option to buy company stock at a 
very low price, or even at no cost, based upon a “triggering event.”7 It prevents takeovers by 
threatening to severely dilute the value of the stock (making it financially unviable for the 
purchaser) and by obligating the acquiror to use the acquired company funds to pay huge 
amounts money to the shareholders instead of using that money to repay the takeover financing.8
These pills also allow the target board management to redeem the pill, or effectively negate the 
 
4 The Developing Meaning of “Tender Offer” Under the Securities and Exchange Act of 1934, 86 Harv. L. Rev. 
1250, 1251-1252 (1973). 
5 Id. 
6 Lucian Bebchuk, A New Approach to Takeover Law and Regulatory Competition, 87 Va. L. Rev. 111, 118 (2001); 
See also Herlihy, Wachtell, Lipton, Rosen & Katz, Takeover Law and Practice 2005, 1528 PLI/Corp 341, 397 
7 Julain Velasco, Just Do It: An Antidote to the Poison Pill, 52 Emory L.J. 849, 856-868 (2004): Here, the triggering 
event would be the hostile acquisition of a certain percentage of common stock. 
8 See Takeover Law and Practice 2005, supra note 6, at 398.  
6option, so that the transaction can go through, which in theory is forces the acquirer to deal with 
the board instead of making a hostile bid.9 Most of the current litigation in this area concerns 
which situations, if any, require a board to redeem the poison pill to allow a takeover attempt. 10 
As of 2005, over 2,300 companies had adopted a poison pill.11 
The poison pill’s inventor, Martin Lipton, argues that he created these measures in order 
to protect corporations from abusive takeover practices and inadequate bids.  He created these 
measures to increase the board’s bargaining position, to protect shareholder investment by 
preventing corporate raiders, and to increase the takeover premium.12 However, Lipton’s 
nemesis, Ronald Gilson, argues that Lipton’s invention does not serve its purposes and is instead 
an abuse of management power to the detriment of the shareholder.13 
Further, boards have used staggered board arrangements in conjunction with Lipton’s 
poison pill, which adds even more bite to this defensive tactic.  In theory, a hostile acquiror can 
overcome a poison pill by waging a proxy contest to oust the defending board and replace it with 
a board that will redeem the poison pill.14 In reality, however, the staggered board entrenches 
existing management against such a tactic.15 A bidder would have to wait through multiple 
voting periods since the only a small number of seats are contestable in any give period, which 
gives the management a veto right over a takeover through numerous election cycles.16 The 
 
9 Id. 
10 Id. at 399. 
11 Id. at 397. 
12 Martin Lipton, Pills, Polls, and Professors Redux, 69 U. Chi. L. Rev. 1037 (2002); See also Martin Lipton, Pills, 
Polls, and Professors: A Reply to Ronald Gilson, 27 Del. J. Corp. L. 1, 10 (2002). 
13 Ronald Gilson, A Structural Approach to Corporations: The Case Against Defensive Tactics in Tender Offers, 33 
Stan. L. Rev. 819, 845-860 (1981). 
14 Guhan Subramanian, Bargaining in the Shadow of Takeover Defenses, 113 Yale L.J. 621, 627 (2003). 
15 Id. 
16 Lucian Bebchuk, A New Approach to Takeover Law and Regulatory Competition, 87 Va. L. Rev. 111, 121 (2001). 
7effectiveness of this defensive duo against acquisition is evidenced by the fact that there are no 
reported cases of successful acquisitions where the board had a poison pill in place.17 
The Fight Card: The Battle of Interests and the Conflict of Laws18 
In this debate over allocation of power, there is a clear line between those who feel the 
board of directors, consistent with its corporate governance role, should have almost unrestricted 
power to choose to accept or defend against a hostile takeover,19 and those who feel the 
shareholders should have the ultimate power to choose whether or not to tender their shares 
without board interference.20 Since current law allows for broad use of defensive powers, it is 
the critics of these powers who bring this debate, and do so most fiercely in respect to an 
arguably “obvious and inherent conflict of interest.”21 Critics argue that although a tender offer 
allows a shareholder to sell his or her stock at a price above the current market value, it also can 
result in the forced removal of the current board of directors, who naturally would like to remain 
in power.22 Further, the board can use its entrenched position to gain advantages, which it would 
not share with the shareholders.23 
In the U.S., states have given broad deference to the board of directors when it comes to 
who gets to decide the corporation’s fate in a hostile tender offer.24 Critics of this power argue 
that this is not an accident, but the result of states seeking to maximize the number of 
 
17 Id.  
18 This section focuses on the theories and arguments of the critics of board deference in applying defenses to 
takeovers. This is not an argument that these theories are correct.  I present first because they are the attacks against 
what is existing law.  There are compelling counters to these arguments, which I present later in this paper. 
19 Herzel, Schmidt, & Davis. Why Corporate Directors Have a Right to Resist Tender Offers, 3 Corp. L. Rev. 107 
(1980). 
20 Lucian Bebchuk, The Case for Increasing Shareholder Power, 118 Harv. L. Rev. 833 (2005). 
21 See A Structural Approach to Corporations, supra note 13, at 819-820. 
22 Id.  
23 See A New Approach to Takeover Law and Regulatory Competition, supra note 16, at 121. Examples of these 
benefits would be like those in Revlon v. MacAndrews and Forbes Holdings, Inc., 506 A.2d 173 (1986) such as 
“Golden Parachutes,” which are bonuses, jobs, and other benefits conferred on the defending board by the acquiror 
in exchange for their cooperation and redemption of any poison pill. 
24 Id. at 132-133. 
8corporations which charter and reincorporate within its borders.25 Indeed, these critics cite the 
adoption of anti-takeover statutes in nearly every state as indicating the desire to provide 
protection to the incumbent management.26 The theory goes that managers want to keep their 
jobs and the benefits that come with it, which they can ensure by choosing a state that provides 
the most obstruction to hostile takeovers.27 
The internal affairs doctrine underlies U.S. corporate law and provides that corporations 
are governed by the laws of the state in which they are incorporated, such that other states must 
defer to the substantive law of the corporation’s jurisdiction.28 This doctrine and the desire to 
draw more corporations into the state has arguably created a “race to the bottom,” which is 
defined as the lessening of shareholder rights and the elevating board powers in order to attract 
more corporate business into the state.  Alternatively, some argue that this competition for 
corporate business has not and will not create a race to the bottom, but will instead lead to a 
“race to the top,” where shareholders will choose not to invest in corporations incorporated under 
unfavorable laws, and which will thus induce states to maximize laws benefiting the 
shareholder.29 Regardless of who wins this debate, the fact remains that current state laws in the 
U.S. defer to the board over the shareholders in deciding when to implement takeover defenses. 
 The E.U., however, takes the alternate view and seeks to elevate the interests of the 
shareholders by forcing board neutrality in a manner consistent with the United Kingdom’s City 
Code, which actually inspired much of the E.U.’s 13th Directive on Takeovers (“the 
 
25 Id.  
26 See A New Approach to Takeover Law and Regulatory Competition, supra note 16 at 129. 
27 Id. 
28 See Takeover Law in the EU and the USA , supra note 1, at 22. 
29 Edhud Kamar, A Regulatory Competition Theory of Indeterminancy in Corporate Law, 98 Colum. L. Rev. 1908, 
1909 (1998). 
9Directive”).30 Article 9 of the Directive presents the clearest departure from U.S. takeover 
practices as it prevents the board of directors from enacting post-bid defensive measures and 
requires it to remain neutral and not act to frustrate the bid.31 The effectiveness of this effort to 
keep the board neutral and less like the U.S. model of strong board anti-takeover powers, 
however, relies on the degree of implementation of the Directive’s principles by the individual 
member states.32 
Contrary to the internal affairs doctrine dominant in the U.S., the E.U. seeks 
harmonization and not competition of different jurisdictional laws, a goal mandated by the 
European Community Treaty and its policy of creating a common market.33 The E.U. is 
currently seeking to draw its members away from the application the European equivalent of the 
internal affairs doctrine, the Incorporation Theory, which would arguably create a “European 
Delaware Syndrome” by creating competition among the member states to introduce more 
permissive corporate law.34 The counter to this permissive theory is the Real Seat doctrine, 
which provides that the country whose laws govern the corporation is the law of the country 
where a corporation has its head office, or “real seat,” and not simply where it incorporates. 35 
This doctrine restricts the movement of corporations to find more permissive laws, because 
although a corporation could in theory still change the jurisdictional law that governs it, doing so 
is unlikely because of practicality and substantial costs.36 Thus, the Real Seat theory arguably 
prevents the Delaware syndrome and a race to the bottom by keeping corporations in place and 
 
30 General Principle VI and Rule 38 of the City Code on Takeovers and Mergers state that during an offer or before 
an imminent offer the management cannot take measures to frustrate that offer; See also Takeover Law in the EU 
and the USA, supra note 1, at 121. 
31 EU Takeover Directive Art. III, 1(c) and Art. 11 (2003).  Section The City Code of the United Kingdom also has 
this same requirement of board neutrality to tender offers . 
32 EU Takeover Directive Art. 12 (2003). 
33 See Takeover Law in the EU and the USA, supra note 1, at 25-30. 
34 Id. at 36-38.  
35 Id. at 38-40 
36 Id. 
10
making it difficult for them to change locations for the purposes of operating under less 
restrictive laws.37 
II. THE UNITED STATES  
 
Corporate Law is State Law: Delaware Reigns Supreme  
 In the United States, corporate law is state law and Delaware leads the field,38 and under 
that law the board of directors has vast authority to manage the affairs of the corporation and to 
block hostile tender offers.  Delaware is “the” place to incorporate based on its experienced 
judiciary, its commitment to meet the needs of its corporate customers and the indeterminacy of 
its law.39 Indeterminacy makes Delaware law incompatible with rival state laws, even those 
similar to Delaware law, which keeps the benefits of incorporating in Delaware away from 
outsiders.40 Indeterminacy can increase the costs of doing business and thereby lessen the 
attractiveness of the laws, however Delaware’s learned and concentrated judiciary keeps these 
costs low, an advantage absent in states whose laws compare to Delaware’s but whose judiciary 
does not. 41 Delaware recognizes this ability of its judiciary to keep the costs of indeterminacy 
low, which has led the state to further invest in it.42 Lastly, the incompatibility with other state 
laws that Delaware’s indeterminacy brings makes it expense for corporations to leave the state, 
thereby keeping corporations in the state lest they have to deal with entirely different laws or at 
least a judiciary less capable of handling corporate issues.43 
37 Id. 
38 See A Regulatory Competition Theory of Indeterminancy in Corporate Law, supra note 29, at 1909:  Delaware has 
attracted over half of the large publicly traded corporations. 
39 Id. at 1909-1913. 
40 Id. 
41 Id. at 1927. 
42 Id. at 1928 
43 Id. 
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Although state law currently runs the show, the federal government, true to form, has 
refused to be left completely out of the regulation game.  The Federal government entered the 
arena in 1968 when it enacted the Williams Act to regulate dramatic increases in the use of cash 
tender offers and to protect shareholders in what was at the time a very secretive and abused 
process of corporate control change.44 The Williams Act added sections 13(d)-(e) and 14(d)-(f) 
to the Securities and Exchange Act of 1934.45 Most importantly, these sections added disclosure 
requirements for the bidding entity as well as time and price limitations. For instance, sections 
13(d) and 14(d) mandate disclosure of bidder identity and information to the company and 
shareholders and requires that such information be filed with the SEC after a beneficial owner 
gains more than a five percent hold of the company stock.46 These provisions apply only to 
certain companies.47 Further, the Act sought to give shareholder not only the best information 
possible, but the best price, and adequate time to consider their options.  Therefore, an acquirer 
must hold all tender offers open for at least 20 days, and if there is any subsequent change in the 
offer, the acquirer must hold the offer open for at least 10 days following the change.48 Also, the 
Act has a “best price rule,” which states that if a bidder makes any subsequent increase in price, 
all tendering shareholders must get that price.49 Although the federal government seeks to 
regulate part of the process, it is still state law which governs the substantive tactics50 that have 
led to the heated debated regarding the respective powers of management and shareholders. 
Statutory Power to the Board: The States Weigh In  
 
44 See Takeover Law in the EU and the USA, supra note 1, at 77. 
4515 USC § 78m (2002); see also Takeover Law in the EU and the USA, supra note 1 at 79. 
46 15 USC § 78m (d)-(e) (2002); 15 USC §78n (d)-(e) (2002). 
47 17 C.F.R. §240.12(g)-1 (1994); 17 C.F.R. §240.12h-3 (1994): These sections only apply to target corporations 
which are 1) listed on a national stock exchange, or 2) where the corporation has assets in excess of $10 million and 
has 500 or more shareholders of that class of security.  
48 17 C.F.R. §240.14e-2 (1994). 
49 17 C.F.R. §240.14d-10 (1994). 
50 See Takeover Law in the EU and the USA, supra note 1, at 76. 
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Arguably the most significant takeover development during the 1980’s and 90’s was the 
development of state takeover laws aimed at providing protection to the local incumbent 
boards.51 Starting with Virginia in 1968, 37 states adopted takeover statutes to more thoroughly 
regulate the tender offer process than the William Act had.52 The state effort of regulating tender 
offers in this first generation of takeover statutes came to an abrupt halt with the Supreme 
Court’s decision in Edgar v. Mite Corp, which declared such regulation unconstitutional.53 The 
state statutes favored management and barred a tender offer anywhere in the US unless the 
requirements of the state statute had been met, which were usually disclosure requirements 
similar to the Williams Act.54 Because of the inherent bias to management and the uncertainty as 
to how many state statutes may be applicable to any one merger, the SEC and private litigants 
attacked these statutes as unconstitutional.  
In Mite, Mite Corporation, a Delaware Corporation, initiated a tender offer for a Chicago 
based company.  Mite followed the disclosure guidelines of the Williams Act but did not follow 
the Illinois law, which required certain disclosure and gave the secretary of state a veto power 
over unfair takeovers, arguing that the Williams Act preempted any such state regulation.55 The 
Court’s problem with the Illinois law was that instead of just regulating the commerce within its 
own boarders, the law had “nationwide reach” which required compliance and gave Illinois the 
ability to control an offer made to a shareholder regardless of in what state that shareholder 
lived.56 The Court held this type of state regulatory statute was unconstitutional it was a direct 
 
51 Matheson and Olson. Shareholder Rights and Legislative Wrongs: Towards Balanced Takeover Legislation, 59 
Geo. Wash. L. Rev. 1425, 1431 (1991). 
52 See Takeover Law in the EU and the USA, supra note 1,  at 87. 
53 Edgar v. Mite Corp., 457 US 624 (1982).  
54 See Takeover Law in the EU and the USA, supra note 1, at 88; See also Shareholder Rights and Legislative 
Wrongs, supra note 51, at 1439.  
55 Mite, 457 US at 626-630. 
56 Id. at 643. 
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burden on interstate commerce (Congress’ domain) and because it frustrated the intent of the 
Williams Act and was a direct burden on interstate commerce.57 
Following this decision, state legislatures went to work again and enacted the next 
generation of takeover statutes: control share acquisition statutes, fair price statutes, cash-out 
statutes, and business combination statutes.58 
Control share acquisition statutes prohibit an acquirer of a certain percentage of stock 
from voting those shares unless a majority of disinterested shareholders grant the acquiror voting 
rights.59 These have the effect imposing significant barriers to a potential acquiror because they 
may be left with an expensive block of shares that they are unable to make any use of.60 
Fair price statutes addressed a two-tiered offer which can cause shareholders to feel 
coerced into tendering their stock in fear of if they hold out and the bid is successful, the acquiror 
will offer a very low price for their shares in the second-tier.61 The statutes generally require that 
the bidder pay a fair price for any non-tendered shares to ensure the price is as fair in the second-
tier as it was in the first tier.62 Further, if the fair price requirements are not met, statutes like 
that of Maryland subject the bidder to the requirement of getting 80% shareholder approval and 
two-thirds disinterested shareholder approval of any second tier merger.63 Although they do help 
to stem some of the coercion in a tender offer, these statutes have not adequately addressed 
“abusive partial bids.”64 
Cash-out statutes, like fair-price statutes, require that an acquiror who has obtained a 
controlling interest in a company, upon request by a non-tendering shareholder, buy the 
 
57 Id. at 640. 
58 See Takeover Law in the EU and the USA, supra note 1 at 89. 
59 See Shareholder Rights and Legislative Wrongs, supra note 51 at 1442. 
60 Id. at 1444. 
61 Id. at 1445. 
62 Id.  
63 Id. 
64 Id. at 1446. 
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outstanding stock at a fair price, forcing the acquiror to buy the stock still outstanding after the 
tender offer at the price offered during the tender offer.65 
Business combination statutes impose a moratorium on specified transactions between 
the target and a shareholder with a certain amount of stock unless the board of directors approves 
the stock acquisition or the transaction prior to the shareholder obtaining a certain percentage of 
the company stock.66 These statutes are supposed to help prevent coercive two-tiered takeovers 
and “bust up” or dismantling takeovers, by preventing action by the acquiror after a successful 
bid.67 
It seemed as though these statutes were doomed to the same fate as the first generation 
statutes declared unconstitutional in Mite.68 In CTS Corp. v. Dynamics Corp. of America,
however, the Supreme Court upheld the constitutionality of these statutes.69 In CTS, the court 
looked at this new generation of state statutes in a challenge to Indiana’s control share 
acquisition law.70 Distinguishing Mite on the basis of that statute’s nationwide blocking power, 
Indiana’s law did not frustrate the William’s Act because these statues sought to place the 
shareholders on equal footing with the bidder and that the mere delay they caused in an 
acquisition was insufficient grounds to find that Williams Act preempted the state law or that the 
state law frustrated the purposes of the Act.71 
The holding in CTS freed states up to enact more stringent anti-takeover legislation.  The 
next generation of statues (the third generation) put the poison pill into action, adopted 
constituency statutes, and adopted director indemnification statutes to give the board of directors 
 
65See Takeover Law in the EU and the USA, supra note 1, at 90.  
66 Id. at 1440-1441 
67 Id. 
68 See Takeover Law in the EU and the USA, supra note 1, at 90. 
69 CTS Corp. v Dynamics Corp. of America, 481 US 69 (1987).  
70 Id. 
71 Id. at 80 – 87.  
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more protection and power in defending against a takeover.72 Hotly debated, this third 
generation of takeover statutes gives the board of directors an unprecedented arsenal of power 
and protection.  Constituency statutes, for instance, diverge from the traditional fiduciary duties 
of directors to shareholders and allow the board of directors to consider other constituencies 
when deciding whether or not to “[unleash] anti-takeover weaponry.”73 Instead of acting to 
maximize the welfare of the shareholder, the statutes allow the board to reject the best offer for 
the shareholders in favor of an alternative constituent such as a creditor, the neighborhood, etc.74 
The board undoubtedly has substantial power under these statutory schemes and those 
incorporated under Delaware law are no exception, especially as defined by the Delaware courts. 
Power to the Board, Delaware Style 
 The source of the corporate board’s power comes from state statutes in line with 
Delaware’s statute that makes the board of directors the sole decision making authority regarding 
the business of the corporation and also from the legal deference paid to those decisions by 
courts under the business judgment rule.75 The business judgment rule is rebuttable presumption 
that the directors are better equipped to make business decisions and that they acted in good 
faith, on an informed basis, and with an honest belief that it was in the best interest of the 
corporation.76 Courts respect this presumption absent a showing that the board abused their 
discretion in making a decision by being ill-informed or self-interested. 77 
72 See Takeover Law in the EU and the USA, supra note 1, at 92-94. 
73 See Shareholder Rights and Legislative Wrongs, supra note 51, at 1449.  The Author cites the Minnesota 
Corporate Statute as an Example.  See Minn.Stat. § 302A.251 subd. 5 (1989): “In discharging the duties of the 
position of director, a director may, in considering the best interests of the corporation, consider the interests of the 
corporation's employees, customers, suppliers, and creditors, the economy of the state and nation, community and 
societal considerations, and the long-term as well as short-term interests of the corporation and its shareholders 
including the possibility that these interests may be best served by the continued independence of the corporation.” 
74 Id.  
75 Del. Gen. Corp. L. §141(a) (1998); Aronson v. Lewis, 473 A.2d  805, 812 (Del., 1984) 
76 Id. 
77 Id. 
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The Delaware courts have applied this deference to the realm of hostile takeovers and the 
board of director’s ability to use defensive tactics.  The deference given to the boards in this 
situation, however, is not as absolute as the pure business judgment rule.  Courts have found it 
proper to regulate management actions where there is a management conflict of interest.78 Thus, 
Delaware courts have applied an enhanced business judgment rule to contests of corporate 
control where it is more tempting for the board to decide an issue in favor of its own interests 
rather than those of the shareholders.79 Further, the Delaware courts have defined a line and a 
limit of deference between defensive actions to protect the company and defensive actions in 
situations where the company is clearly for sale or its break-up is inevitable.80 
This enhanced business judgment rule came out of the Delaware Supreme Court decision 
in Unocal Corp. v. Mesa Petroleum (“Unocal”).81 Mesa was a minority shareholder in Unocal 
and initiated a hostile tender offer to buy Unocal stock, which the Unocal board felt was 
insufficient.82 In response, the Unocal board issued a self-tender offer to buy back Unocal stock 
at a price above that offered per share by Mesa and excluded Mesa from this offer.83 The board’s 
reasoning for this exclusion was that if it in fact bought back Mesa’s shares it would be in 
essence financing Mesa’s own inadequate tender offer.84 The board also believed that Mesa’s 
financing was inadequate, which would coerce shareholders to tender because Mesa would offer 
 
78 See A Structural Approach to Corporations, supra note 13, at 823-825.  
79 See Director Primacy and Corporate Governance, supra note 2, at 1145.  
80 See Revlon v. MacAndrews and Forbes Holdings, Inc., 506 A.2d 173 (Del. 1986) versus Paramount 
Communications v. Time, Inc., 571 A.2d 1152 (Del.1989). 
81 Unocal Corp. v. Mesa Petroleum, 493 A.2d 946 (Del. 1985). 
82 Id. at 949 - 954 
83 Id. 
84 Id.
17
holdouts significantly less after a successful takeover and because Mesa had a reputation of 
being a “greenmailer.”85 
The Unocal court affirmed the broad powers that §141(a) granted to the board of 
directors as the managers of corporate business and affairs and expanded this power to the 
board’s authority to protect the corporate entity and shareholders from a reasonably perceived 
threat irrespective of its source.86 Because of the threat of self-interest in the takeover context, 
however, the court felt that defensive tactic decisions had to be scrutinized under an enhanced 
business judgment rule, which requires the board to show that through good faith and reasonable 
investigation 1) they reasonably perceived a threat to the corporate entity by another person’s 
acquisition of ownership and 2) their response was proportional to the perceived threat.87 This 
process for determining whether the business judgment rule applies has been labeled the “Unocal 
test.” The court found the Unocal board to have met this enhanced scrutiny because of the nature 
and price of Mesa’s offer and its reputation for greenmailing.88 
Essentially, the ability of the board to meet its burden under the Unocal test is the “whole 
ballgame.”89 The test created a case-by-case or fact sensitive analysis where if the board of 
directors carries its burden, the business judgment rule will apply to shield its decision from 
judicial intervention.90 But, if the board fails to meet its burden, the court applies much stricter 
and almost impassible intrinsic fairness test.91 
85 Id.: See also footnote 13 in Unocal: Mesa had a reputation of being a greenmailer, a different form of blackmail, 
where a party purposely makes an insufficient offer in order to coax the target company to buy back the  potential 
acquirer’s stock at a premium to prevent them from taking control of the company with the undervalued tender offer. 
86 Id. at 954 
87 Id. at 955 
88 Unocal, 493 A.2d 946. 
89 See Director Primacy and Corporate Governance, supra note 2, at 1146 
90 Id. 
91 Id. 
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In the same year as Unocal, the Delaware Supreme Court also decided Moran v. 
Household Intern., Inc. 92 Household adopted a “poison pill” as a preventative measure against 
any possible futures takeovers, which allowed for shareholders in the event of a successful 
takeover to purchase $200 worth of stock from the acquirer for $100.93 The current board had 
the authority to redeem the rights at a very low price.94 The court held that Delaware 
Corporations Code §157 allowed a board of directors to deploy a “poison pill” without 
shareholder approval in order to prevent a hostile tender offer95 (emphasis added).  Further, if 
faced with a hostile tender offer and a request to redeem the rights, the company could not 
arbitrarily deny the request, but such a denial must be a legitimate and non-conflicted exercise of 
board power subject to court scrutiny under Unocal.96 
In Revlon, however, the Delaware Court invalidated the defensive action of the Revlon 
board and made clear that although broad, the board of director’s authority was not absolute.  
There, Pantry Pride initiated a tender offer for Revlon stock, which the Revlon board felt was too 
low.97 In response to the initial low tender offer and the subsequent increased Pantry Pride 
tender offer bid premiums, Revlon knew that its sale was inevitable and sought out a “white 
knight,” Forstmann.  Eventually, Revlon granted Forstmann lock-up options98 in Revlon assets, 
which effectively ended bidding even though the Pantry Pride bid was higher.99 The Court held 
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that this type of situation was different than Unocal.100 Once a company is clearly for sale, the 
board has a duty to play auctioneer and to secure the highest price possible for the common 
stock.101 Ignoring the duty to the shareholders to maximize the sale price in favor of a deal 
which protected the directors from liability to note holders breached the board’s duty of 
loyalty.102 Revlon reaffirmed Unocal’s requirements to show reasonable response to a 
reasonably perceived threat, but more importantly stated the board’s duty is altered to that of an 
auctioneer once change of control or sale is inevitable.103 
The Court clarified this standard in Paramount Communications v. Time, Inc.104 The 
court identified two scenarios which invoke the Revlon auctioneer duty: when the board actively 
initiates a bidding to sell itself or break-up the company, and also where the board abandons the 
company’s long term strategy in favor of a break-up of the company.105 Paramount made a 
tender offer to Time, which Time labeled as inadequate based upon the likely merger between 
Time and Warner, which would dramatically increase the value of the company.106 The board, 
concerned that shareholders would tender, restructured the merger of Warner as a tender offer 
and prevented the shareholders from accepting the Paramount offer.107 The Court held that such 
Time’s action did not invoke either of the Revlon situations because there was no evidence that 
the reworked merger with Warner represented either a decision to sell Time or an effort to break-
up the Time.108 The Court found that the defensive response was reasonable to the perceived 
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threat and that such action didn’t prevent Paramount from subsequently bidding on the combined 
Time-Warner.109 
The previous cases lead us to the modern day framework enunciated in Paramount v. 
QVC.110 Paramount agreed to merge with Viacom and amended the company’s poison pill to 
permit the merger, and also granted Viacom stock lockups and a no-shop promise.111 QVC then 
made a tender offer bid, which Viacom countered, which QVC subsequently countered.  
Paramount refused to alter its preference for Viacom, calling QVC’s offer illusory.112 The court 
restated the Revlon rule and its auctioneer requirements when the company initiates a bidding 
process or when its break-up is inevitable, or where there will be a change in control.  But, the 
court noted that Revlon is not limited to just these two scenarios.113 The court found that this 
case fell into the first category because the Paramount board had essentially entered into a 
bidding process and thus had a duty to modify its bid with Viacom and negotiate with QVC in 
order to get the highest price for the shareholders.114 The court stated that the board has a duty to 
protect its Shareholders in a change of control because when a buyout or change of control is 
inevitable the shareholders become minority shareholders and lose any meaningful voting 
influence.115 
Through the preceding cases and Unitrin,116 the Delaware courts have validated the vast 
board power to defend against takeovers, and have subjected this power to very few limitations, 
such as the bidding or break-up process of Revlon or QVC.
109 Id. at 1155. 
110 Paramount Communications, Inc. v. QVC Network, Inc., 637 A.2d 34 (1994). 
111 Id.
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of review as laid out in Unocal.
21
Recent Bad Behavior: The Federal Hammer and Its Effect on the Future of 
Court Deference to the Board 
 In June 2002, the Congress passed the Sarbanes-Oxley Act in response to management 
scandals such as Enron and WorldCom in order to create and enforce more stringent 
management accountability.  In doing so Congress may have indeed affected the amount of 
deference the Delaware courts are now willing to give to management.117 In a late 2003 article, 
an author noted that in every case dealt with by the Delaware courts regarding directorial powers 
and duties after Congress passed the Sarbanes-Oxley in 2002, the courts had ruled against 
management and in favor of shareholder power.118 Another significant occurrence was the 
expansion of the Blasius doctrine into the Unocal realm of corporate control and defenses.119 
In Blasius, the Delaware court addressed a case where the Atlas board, in response to a 
possible future proxy fight with Blasius, expanded the size of board and filled the vacancies in 
order to thwart Blasius, not from taking complete control, but from gaining enough board seats 
to implement what the Atlas board felt were bad policies.120 The court acted to protect 
shareholder voting rights and held that a high standard of scrutiny applies where board actions 
have the primary purpose of impairing the shareholding franchise and that the board has the 
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burden to show a compelling justification for its conduct.121 Thus, a court can find a violation of 
board duties even where the board acted reasonably and in good faith, these requirements being 
the same requirements under Unocal that invoke deference under the business judgment rule.122 
This is significant because no board has ever met the burden under Blasius.123 
In 2003, the Blasius review toppled the board powers and deference in defensive actions 
in Liquid Audio124 The Delaware Supreme Court expanded the impassible compelling 
justification test beyond actions to change board size to prevent shareholder voting on new 
directors, which would not have the effect of an outright change of control, and applied it to the 
realm of defensive measures enacted by the board to prevent a change of control by interfering 
with the shareholder’s ability to elect directors.125 This case makes a pro-shareholder move and 
marks the willingness and ability of the courts to ignore the business judgment rule and apply 
their own judgment, arguably to the detriment of corporations and corporate law.126 
Scholars argue that this move against board deference is directly related to Congress 
enacting Sarbanes-Oxley.127 Delaware courts have historically reacted to and changed its 
policies when threatened with federal preemption into historically state regulated corporate 
issues and it is argued that this current move is Delaware’s response to Sarbanes-Oxley to avoid 
further Congressional meddling.128 This trend may lead away from Unocal, its business 
judgment deference, and the policy that absent abuse, management is the more skilled corporate 
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decision maker, and may lead to substantive scrutiny of board defensive actions taken in hostile 
takeovers.129 
The Power Struggle and the Great Debate: Shareholders v. Board 
Is all this power a good thing?  As stated previously, state law favors incumbent 
management in the takeover context providing them with a vast array of tools to fend off 
potential acquirors.  Proponents of these defensive measures cite the necessary deference to 
board business decisions and apply that rationale to the ability to protect shareholders from 
insufficient bids, to encourage higher premiums, to protect the shareholders from a distorted 
choice of whether or not to tender their shares, and to implement and execute long-term company 
goals.130 
There are, however, many academics who argue that the legislatures and courts have 
gone too far and have given too much deference to the board of directors especially in the 
defenses arena where there is such an apparent conflict of interest between the board’s desire to 
stay in power and the shareholders desire to maximize their investment.131 Further, they argue 
that tender offers are an essential component in maintaining optimal corporate governance.132 
Efficient Market Theory
Opponents of the defenses, such as Professor Gilson, argue that the unencumbered tender 
offer serves a crucial role in the modern corporate structure.  The tender offer serves as a market 
check on the performance of management by replacing poor management to increase corporate 
performance, which leads to more optimal and proficient management and thereby lends support 
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to giving the board deference in other areas.133 Essentially, the threat of a takeover propels the 
board to act efficiently and in the best interests of the company and shareholders.  Defensive 
tactics negate this market check by allowing even the inefficient board the power to entrench 
itself, thus negating any incentive to act more efficiently.134 Why work harder if you cannot get 
fired?  Professor Bebchuk concurs with Gilson stating that a board veto over a tender offer 
diminishes the disciplinary force that a takeover threat can exert on incumbents,135 resulting in 
poorer management performance, lower profit margins, less return on equity, slower sales 
growth, and an overall reduction in firm value.136 
Opponents also cite the inconsistency and hypocrisy they find in the board’s fight to keep 
their defensive tactics. They argue that the boards cannot play both sides of the regulation 
argument, espousing the use of the free market as a check on their bad behavior, but then 
advocating a regulated market in order to veto hostile takeovers.137 
Supporters of the defenses, however, disagree with the validity of the market theory,138 
stating that there simply is no evidence that takeovers actually perform any type of disciplinary 
role and that research and real life experience have undermined that argument.139 In fact, they 
argue that the poison pill has not reduced takeover activity or reduced any shareholder returns, 
citing that since 1985 Delaware merger and acquisition activity has actually increased.140 
Further, the supporters draw support for their argument from history, claiming that 
defensive devices and in particular the poison pill are necessary tools.  In the mid 1980’s 
corporations were falling to corporate raiders armed with junk-bonds and singing the efficient 
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market theory battle cry.141 Recognizing a threat to corporate welfare and its inability to function 
in an environment where there is a permanent “For Sale” sign,142 Martin Lipton created the pill 
to allow a target board the ability to control its own destiny and make an informed decision to 
remain independent.143 Further, its intent and its result is not an absolute block to corporate 
takeovers, but rather it seeks to promote takeovers through the proxy/board replacement process 
or a tender offer approved by an informed board.144 Essentially, the pill gives the board 
sufficient time (more than the 20 days the Williams Act gives) to carefully consider the bid and 
make the informed decision, but does not provide absolute insulation.145 
As mentioned previously, however, opponents claim that Lipton’s reliance on the proxy 
as an effective means of corporate change of control may in fact be a moot point when a board 
couples the poison pill with a staggered board.146 If the only way to prevent the poison pill from 
killing a tender offer is to gain control of the board through a proxy contest and redeem the pill, 
the staggered board prevents this for a sufficient amount time to make the takeover idea 
unappealing to a prospective bidder.147 The interesting point here is that the staggered board, 
although arguably a defensive tactic by itself by slowing down the ability of an acquiror to take 
control of the board, is more a defense of the poison pill, which makes the staggered board a very 
important part of a corporation.148 
Supporters of defenses, however, state that the proxy contest is actually easier and more 
successful for a party seeking proxies in order to redeem the pill and buy the stock from the 
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shareholders at a premium.  The likelihood of success increases because its election platform is 
much more appealing.149 Instead of the solicitor asking for votes because it will manage the 
company better, it asks for the votes so that it can buy the stock at a premium over market 
price.150 Yet, it still remains the case that the staggered board requires not one, but at least two 
proxy contests in order to overcome the poison pill.151 So, even though in theory there is still the 
possibility of successful contests, no bidder has ever actually succeeded in doing so.152 
Supporters also argue that the corporation does not exist solely for the benefit of the 
shareholder’s short-term gains and that it would be dangerous to force corporations into acting as 
if they did.153 Delaware has rejected the efficient market theory for this very reason.154 The 
danger of doing so is evident when one looks at the market occurrences over the last two 
decades.  First, any company under-valued in the 1980’s would have been bought out for a slight 
premium, which would have led those companies and their shareholders to miss out on the long-
term 1000% increase in stock market value since then.155 More alarming would be a 
reoccurrence of the tech-stock bubble of 1999-2000, where a company forced to look only at 
short-term gain may have been pressured into allowing a takeover by an extremely overvalued 
and doomed company.156 It is these dangers which supporters seek to prevent by allowing 
companies to consider long-term goals and to protect shareholders from a short-term gain, which 
ends up being an illusion.  The Delaware courts have protected corporations from these forces by 
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stating that the board “is not obliged to abandon a deliberately conceived corporate plan for a 
short-term shareholder profit unless there is clearly no basis to sustain the corporate strategy.”157 
As a corollary to this argument board supporters claim shareholders should leave the 
board alone to manage the company.  For the same reasons that the business judgment rule 
operates in other arenas, it should operate in the takeover context because management is best 
suited, informed, and motivated to evaluate the takeover bid not only for its present value but in 
relation to future value of the firm.158 The value of the corporate form is not the ability to raise 
money, but the ability to effectively manage a myriad of complex issues and players with an 
efficient hierarchical structure.159 “Investor involvement in corporate decision making threatens 
to disrupt the very mechanism that makes the public corporation practicable; namely, the 
centralization of essentially non-reviewable decision making authority in the board of 
directors.”160 The counterpoint to this argument leads us into the next area of debate.  
Shareholders agree that managers should exercise control over regular business decisions, but 
should not exercise that same control over tender offers because self-interest impairs their 
judgment.161 
Conflict of Interest
Opponents cite the inherent conflict of interest, claiming that managers are not loyal 
agents and may act to benefit their own interest, in the face of conflicting shareholder 
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interests.162 For example, managers may act to save their jobs,163 reject bids benefiting 
shareholders in order to make a deal with a favored acquiror,164 or use the threat of a veto (held 
in its poison pill) to extract payments, or so-called golden parachutes, that would benefit 
management but would have no benefit, if not cause detriment to the shareholders.165 
As for the shareholders, management’s entrenchment behind its use of defensive tactics 
arguably decreases the shareholder welfare.166 Tender offers give the shareholders the 
opportunity to sell their stock at a premium above the current and arguably true value of the 
stock, an opportunity that is arguably inalienable.167 If the board uses its defensive measures, the 
shareholder loses out on this opportunity.168 
Further, this lost opportunity may indeed create a vicious cycle of market inefficiency 
cited by Bebchuk and Gilson.  Defensive measures that raise the costs of a tender offer 
discourage prospective future bidders for other targets, which will affect the number of bidders 
and thereby weakening the utility of the market as a check or managerial monitoring system.169 
But, takeover defense supporters refute these assertions in light of the judicial standards 
of review and effect defensive tactics have on offers.  First, supporters claim that boards cannot 
arbitrarily reject tender offers because the Unocal/Unitrin standard requires that the board have 
acted reasonably and on an informed basis.170 Also, supporters claim that defensive tactics, 
especially the poison pill act to deter inadequate bids and increase the premium offered to 
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shareholders.171 By giving the board the defensive powers to screen and veto a bid, it forces the 
unsolicited bidder to negotiate, giving the board the power to extract a higher price than initially 
offered.172 Moreover, these supporters argue that equity rights are contractual, and that 
“shareholders do not possess a contractual right to receive takeover bids.  [Instead], the 
shareholders' ability to gain premiums through takeover activity is subject to the good faith 
business judgment of the board of directors in structuring defensive tactics.”173 
Although there certainly are judicial standards of review, which require the board to act 
in an informed and reasonable manner when deciding to defend against a takeover, the 
opponents of the defenses argue the insufficiency of the real life effectiveness of such safeguards 
against board power.174 In Moran, the court stated that the right to use a poison pill was not 
absolute, leaving open room for situations when the board may be required by its fiduciary duties 
to redeem the pill and allow the takeover.175 Further, state courts including Delaware and New 
York have struck down attempts by the boards to protect the pill by either making them non-
redeemable (dead-hand provisions), redeemable only by the current target board (no-hand 
provisions), or making it redeemable only after a certain time has passed (slow-hand 
provisions).176 Even with these judicial decisions, the Delaware courts have not ordered the 
redemption of a pill since the mid 1980’s,177 which leaves the opponents of defensive powers 
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questioning the teeth that these review standards actually have,178 and the board power 
supporters praising corporations for not abusing their discretion to implement defenses.179 
Distorted Choice
Perhaps the only area where there is consensus between the two warring sides is on the 
danger of the shareholders distorted choice in responding to a tender offer.  The anti-defense side 
even concedes (without conceding that the power should actually be given) that protection from 
the distorted choice may be valid reason to give defensive power to the board.180 However, the 
two sides disagree as to how best handle the danger. 
 The distorted choice occurs when deciding whether or not to tender shares.  The theory 
posits that a shareholder will tender her shares, even though the takeover is not in her best 
interest because she fears that if the takeover is successful, the post-takeover value of her 
untendered shares will be significantly less than the bid price.181 This pressure to tender is 
detrimental to the shareholder and the corporation because tendering out of fear instead of 
tendering to replace poor or inefficient management is a waste of corporate assets and is contrary 
to the idea that takeovers are desirable only when they create efficiency gains.182 
The anti-takeover camp argues, for many of the same reasons as argued above against 
takeover defenses, that defensive tactics lead to social waste by preventing efficient takeovers, 
and fail to prevent the distorted choice.183 
One solution to this problem is a essentially a two question tender offer: Does the 
shareholder want the tender offer to be successful; and in the event that it is successful does the 
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shareholder want to tender her shares.184 This solution acts to end the distorted choice because 
there is no longer the pressure to tender shares blindly and in fear that the shareholder may suffer 
monetarily if the takeover goes through.185 The tender offer would only go through if a majority 
of shareholders felt the transaction was beneficial and if that is the case, then even the dissenters 
will have their shares bought at the premium value.186 Conversely, if the vote on the takeover 
question fails, those who wanted to tender may still get to have their shares bought by the 
potential acquiror.187 
Supporters of the defenses dislike this alternative for a number of reasons.  Most bluntly, 
supporters claim the shareholders simply do not have the power to take a separate vote denying 
or approving a tender offer.188 The board has the duty and right to make the final decision in all 
but a very few areas of corporate governance and shareholders lack authority to strip the board of 
its control or even review its decisions.189 
A toned down criticism argues that the proper defense against distorted choice lies in the 
poison pill and proxy battle.190 Having the shareholder referendum on the tender offer puts that 
old “For Sale” sign back on the corporation assuring any potential bidder a vote on the offer and 
leaving the target board powerless to do anything else but declare the corporation up for 
auction.191 Further, even if the tender offer fails, the board will expend major amounts of 
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company resources to protect the business.192 In the end, the supporters argue that the poison pill 
is the best method at protecting the company and the shareholders.193 
The United States: Directors Win, But the Debate Continues 
 As it stands, the board of directors under U.S. state law has enormous power to make 
business decisions, whether those are everyday decisions or decisions on takeovers.  The heated 
debate focuses on the balance of power between the board and the shareholders and the board’s 
duty to act in the best interest of the shareholders.  Although there are those who feel that events 
like Enron have brought the tide back toward shareholder power, such a move at this point seems 
uncertain.  What is certain, however, is that no matter how the tide moves, the debate will 
continue. 
III. THE EUROPEAN UNION 
 
After almost 30 years of planning, 15 years of debate, and one failed attempt to enact 
takeover legislation, in late 2003 the E.U. finally approved a takeover directive.194 Although this 
effort has been in the works for some time, this debate does not have the history in the E.U. that 
it does in the U.S.  Hostile takeovers have historically been so infrequent as to be a non-issue in 
the E.U.195 It was not until the same time period that the US began debating the new found 
poison pill that the E.U. member states began discussing and implementing national law to deal 
with the increasing number of hostile takeovers, most of which mirrored the U.K. City Code and 
its pro-shareholder choice/director neutrality model.196 Interestingly, when the E.U. recognized 
the need for some sort of multinational takeover regulation, the same divisive and on-going 
 
192 Id. 
193 Id. 
194 Erik Berglöf  and Mike Burkart, European Takeover Regulation, at 189-191 (2003). Available at SSRN: 
http://ssrn.com/abstract=405660. 
195 Id. at 186. 
196 Id. 
33
debate occurring in the US (encouraging takeovers versus allowing defensive tactics) hindered 
its efforts.197 
Hostile takeovers are rare in the E.U., 198 however the harmonization of takeover laws is 
seen as key to fulfilling the ideal of a common market among the member states199 and 
ultimately to challenge U.S. economic and political dominance.200 The underlying objective is to 
release companies into the market of corporate control, essentially subscribing to the efficient 
market theory, with the expectation that the free market will discipline management and lead to 
optimal performance and economic growth.201 The European Takeover Directive is now in its 
final stages of implementation.  Because of the opt-out provisions, however, which made the 
Directive politically viable, but also made important provisions optional, it is yet to be seen 
whether or not the Directive will provide the cohesive system it was designed to promote or if its 
harmonizing goals will instead remain a fiction among a the diverse web of national law. 
The Framework Approach and the E.U.’s Own “Federalist” Issues 
 The E.U.’s efforts at enacting takeover legislation focus on creating a general set of 
principles and basic requirements and not over-encompassing and detailed legislation.  This 
approach is an effort to respect the national laws and sovereignty of each member, requiring that 
they individually enact the detailed law to effectuate the principles and guidelines.202 Thus, the 
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harmonization which the E.U. seeks is not an effort at total legislative uniformity,203 but instead a 
theoretical and principled uniformity to drive individual national law. 
 In this regard, the E.U. has a similar structure to that of the U.S. internal affairs doctrine 
because corporate law, and takeover law specifically, is the law of the country in which the 
company incorporates.204 Although not completely unifying, the Directive goes a lot further in 
its attempt to harmonize substantive law than does the Williams Act, which remains primarily 
procedural.205 Most illustrative, the Directive seeks to prohibit unauthorized use of the poison 
pill and other defensive measures, whereas in the U.S., restrictions or allowances on this front 
remain entirely subject to state law.206 
The Road to Harmonization – Failed Attempts 
 In 2001, the European Parliament rejected a proposed multinational takeover Directive, 
the 13th Directive on Takeovers.207 Discussed below are the proposal’s history, its elements, and 
ultimately its rejection.   
The real push towards multinational takeover regulation began in 1985 upon publication 
of the “White Paper” by the European Commission, which emphasized the need for cross-border 
collaboration in order to achieve the goal of a common market.208 Along side this academic 
push, Italian Carlo de Benedetti’s attempt to gain control a very large Belgian holding company, 
Société Générale de Belgique, provided a real life catalyst for legislation.209 This takeover 
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attempt was a fierce battle which employed a plethora of defensive tactics and revealed the need 
for a European regulation to fill an obvious cross-border takeover void.210 
Ten years later and after many reworked drafts, the European Council trumpeted the 
proposed Directive as essential to making Europe the leading world economy.211 With such high 
expectations, the impact of the vote to reject the takeover Directive was “tragic…and a major 
set-back to the goal of reaching an integrated capital market.”212 The failure came as a shock 
partly because the proposed Directive was only a framework and not mandatory law, giving 
leeway to national law and prerogatives in its implementation, and also because the Directive 
was based on the U.K. City Code provisions, which many member states were already enforcing 
versions of.213 
The aim of this failed Directive was to set minimum guidelines for the conduct of 
takeover bids, minimum levels of shareholders safeguards, and to create a minimal level of 
harmonization between the laws of the many nations.214 Underlying this effort, however, was 
the Directive’s fatal rule, board neutrality.215 This rule encourages hostile takeovers by requiring 
that the board of the target company to remain neutral in the face of a tender offer and not act to 
defeat the offer with defensive tactics unless the shareholders give specific authority to do so 
during the offer period.216 This provision prevents the use of U.S. style defenses like the popular 
poison pill, allowing defenses only after specific approval during the bid period itself.217 
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The fallout from the neutrality rule ended the debate on provisions such as equal 
shareholder protection and mandatory bid rules, which arguably would have benefited the 
European market and corporate governance, and focused the debated exclusively on the benefits 
and detriments of takeovers and whether or not they should be encouraged or discouraged.218 
The focus on this element of the Directive resulted in its failure and negated the 
economic and other benefits of the Directive.  The Directive would have increased much needed 
European restructuring by opening up the corporate takeover market, allowing the break-up of 
conglomerates in favor of concentration and specialization.219 Further, by offering better 
investment and shareholder protection, it would have made the E.U. markets more attractive, 
thereby bringing in more foreign investment and venture capital to help the needy technology 
sector.220 The absence of such shareholder protection makes the E.U. markets less desirable than 
the U.K. or U.S. markets.221 
This debate, however, was not an unimportant one.  As debated in the U.S., the E.U. 
politicians questioned the true effectiveness of the market as a check on corporate efficiency.222 
Further, there was great concern that allowing takeovers would bring the perceived less 
advantageous elements of the U.S. system across the Atlantic, most notably: the attention on 
short-term profits over long-term strategy, the corporate cut-backs, and the ever increasing 
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income discrepancy between management and employees.223 Also, the European push to allow 
the market forces to act on takeovers developed during the dot.com boom in the U.S.  Europe 
tried feverishly to join in by enacting the policies that were causing such enormous economic 
growth in the U.S.224 Towards the late stages of the failed Directive, however, the dot.com boom 
came crashing down, which led many European leaders to question the effectiveness of giving 
the shareholders more power in corporate governance and attacked the efficient market idea, 
which pushed corporations to focus on short-term gains over long term strategy.225 
Germany takes the blame for the ultimate failure of the Directive because of its last 
minute withdrawal of approval, which centered on its fear of increased takeovers.226 The 
negotiations and the proposed Directive failed because of the German rejection of the E.U.’s 
desire to follow the UK’s model of directorial neutrality.227 In the wake of the fiercely fought 
takeover of Germany’s Mannesmann by the UK’s Vodafone, even with numerous compromises 
in its favor on other regulations, the German government was simply not going to sign onto any 
legislation which forced neutrality on the board of directors.228 
Germany did not like the idea of what it perceived to be unfair takeover advantages 
imbedded in the national laws of other countries, which the Directive would not sufficiently 
limit.229 Essentially, there are unique risks associated with cross border acquisitions because of 
the possibility that an outside acquiror will act in favor of its home country at the expense of the 
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target country and the employees or other stakeholders there.230 What helps to end this type of 
“entrepreneurial nationalism” is a system where all companies are equally vulnerable to 
takeovers.231 On equal ground, a foreign acquirer’s bias in its operations may lead to lower 
performance and deteriorating public support in the host country, which creates the opportunity 
for a new entity to acquire the company.232 A flaw in the proposed Directive was the focus on 
defensive tactics of boards, but the lack of effective parameters regarding elements of national 
corporate structure, such as state retention of special voting rights called “golden shares,” which 
restrict the transfer of corporate control and are equally dangerous in causing the above 
nationalistic risks.233 In practice, these government holds make companies unappealing to a 
hostile bidder looking for control.234 There is discrepancy between the member nations as to 
who has these provisions.235 
In the years leading up to the proposed Directive, Germany opened itself up to the market 
for corporate control on a scale much grander than that of its E.U. partners had done and thus had 
more to fear from the “entrepreneurial nationalism” than its neighbors.236 Germany’s late stage 
withdrawal of support tied the vote, which caused the measure to fail and provoked widespread 
animosity.237 
Although the Directive failed, the E.U. commissioners favoring a cohesive takeover 
system immediately went back to work.  They convened the “Winter Group” to research and 
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propose a politically viable and effective takeover regulation, which resulted in a revised and 
ultimately adopted 13th Directive, which is discussed in detail below.238 
Germany Fills the Void: Delaware Would Be Proud  
 
Historically, Germany signed onto the UK thinking regarding director neutrality in tender 
offers, but it changed its mind and while working to defeat the E.U. proposed takeover Directive, 
it also began working on its own national law to give German boards of directors the powers 
they needed to defend against hostile takeovers.239 Enacted in 2001, Section 33 of the German 
Securities and Acquisitions Act directly rejects the E.U. neutrality principle in favor of giving the 
boards the power to defend against hostile takeovers.240 But, this mandate does not allow the 
U.S. board’s weapon of choice, the poison pill.241 Critics argue that the lack of a poison pill may 
be detrimental to German companies because it may leave the boards with no choice but to use 
the permitted value-reducing measures, such as selling significant assets, which can ultimately 
lead to the “destruction of the firm in order to save it.”242 
Section 33(1) allows management to implement limited defensive measures with the 
approval of the supervisory board and without first getting shareholder approval, such as the sale 
of essential assets or use of authorized capital.243 As stated above these are potentially 
destructive and irreversible tactics, yet they do not require shareholder approval.   
 Section 33(2) adds to the limited powers above by giving the board an alternate source of 
authority, the shareholders.  This section allows the shareholders at the shareholders meeting to 
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grant the board the authority to implement defensive measures prior to any known tender offer, 
with such authorization being renewable every 18 months.244 
Interestingly, these two grants of power are separate and the shareholder approval 
allowance under §33(2) does not restrict the power of the supervisory board to authorize 
defensive measures consistent with §33(1).245 Further, the board is not likely to seek shareholder 
approval in fear that the shareholders may deny this authority, which leaves the board in a more 
precarious position as to what defensive measures it can and cannot legally implement.246 
Critics argue that Germany, in enacting this legislation, has participated in a U.S. style 
race to the bottom, largely propelled by labor union fears regarding the perceived negative 
effects of hostile takeovers on co-determination.247 Although written to give the shareholders a 
say in the implementation of defensive tactics, by granting the supervisory board its own 
discretionary power, the German takeover law arguably gave the board the deferential power 
equivalent to that in the U.S, but absent the shareholder protection that U.S. courts offer248 by 
way of Unocal and other fiduciary standards.   
 This discretion of the supervisory role can essentially be even more profound when 
viewed in the context of the make-up of the German two-tiered board structure.  As stated 
previously, the labor unions lobbied for the defensive powers as a way to protect the workers of 
German corporations.  Under German law, most corporate supervisory boards are comprised of 
one-half labor representatives, leaving only half of the board with directly representing the 
shareholders.249 Thus, if the labor representatives oppose a tender offer to protect the worker’s 
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rights, even at the detriment of the shareholders and a large premium, they only need one 
shareholder representative to agree with them in order to authorize management to take a 
defensive action.250 
Thus, in the absence of E.U. regulation and in response to their own fears which ended 
the viability of the initial 13th Directive, Germany enacted laws completely counter to the 
principles espoused in the failed Directive and more inline with U.S. style board defensive 
powers.  These developments were seen as potentially damaging not only to Germany, but to the 
EU as a whole.   
 First, the German laws restricted the openness of the market for corporate control, which 
scholars see as crucial to modernizing EU corporations, ultimately leading to greater E.U. 
competitiveness in the global economics and politics.251 
Second, by giving such broad defensive powers to the board, but at the same time 
disallowing the poison pill, the boards will adopt more self-destructive measures and result in a 
takeover system having more detrimental effects than the U.S. system.252 For all the criticism of 
the poison pill, it allows a company to staunchly defend against a takeover without obliterating 
the corporation in the process.253 Without the pill, corporate boards may resort to the sale of 
assets or other alternative and irreversibly harmful errors.254 Also, the German board structure 
places a greater emphasis on the stakeholder to the detriment of the shareholder by allowing the 
board to ignore the shareholder interests without too much fear of removal.255 In the U.S., even 
with takeover discretion, the board is arguably still receptive to shareholder interests, especially 
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the large institutional shareholders.256 A U.S. board that ignores these interests and parties is 
may face removal in a proxy fight.257 In Germany, this result, though possible, is highly 
unlikely.258 
In the end, some scholars believed that the 13th Directive’s failure and the German 
legislative response meant the end of the effort to enact unifying takeover legislation.  Hopeful 
voices, however, stated their belief that the animosity towards the German withdrawal and its 
national legislation would possibly provide the political momentum needed to pass new takeover 
legislation.  These individuals argued that the German unilateral protectionist act would show 
other nations the pitfalls of not having an E.U. regulation and would thus lessen Germany’s 
credibility in tying to garner support to defeat a new E.U. takeover effort.259 To this end, 
Germany’s withdraw of support was seen as a positive catalyst to makeover the weaknesses in 
the 13th Directive and pass a redrafted E.U. Takeover Directive.260 
The Current Legislation – The Good, The Bad, and The Opt-Out Provision 
 
In the wake of the defeated legislation and Germany’s own takeover code, the E.U. was 
unwilling to abandon its efforts to enact takeover legislation.  A “high level group of corporate 
law experts” (a.k.a. the Winter group) was convened to study the unresolved issues surrounding 
the 13th Directive’s failure, ultimately endorsing the major provisions of the failed Directive, in 
particular Article 9’s board neutrality requirement, and giving the 13th Directive new life.261 The 
E.U. passed this revised 13th Directive (“the Directive”) into law on April 21, 2004 and the E.U. 
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member nations must implement it by May of 2006.262 In doing so, the E.U. has gone above and 
beyond the federal regulations of the US and into the realm of substantive regulation. 
 The Directive covers a wide range of issues, many of which mirror the Williams Act, for 
example, mandatory bid periods, best price rules, and disclosure requirements.263 The key 
provisions are covered below: mandatory bids, board neutrality, the breakthrough rule, and the 
opt-out provision. 
Mandatory Bids, Fair Price, and Minority Shareholder Protection: Article 5
Article 5 requires that where any party (or cooperative group) attains a specified 
percentage of shares in a company, the member state must require that party to make a fair bid to 
all shareholders, as a means of protecting the minority shareholders.264 An equitable price is the 
highest price paid by the acquiror for stock during a time period chosen by the member state, but 
which must be within 9-12 months prior to the required bid.265 
Importantly, the E.U. has delegated the responsibility of setting the triggering share 
percentage to the individual member states.266 This allocation of control to the individual 
national legislatures is the result of compromises to allow the individual nation to set percentages 
that will work with their own corporate system.267 Although deviating from harmonization, the 
different triggering percentages can still cause the same result, based upon whether the individual 
member state has a concentrated corporate control system or a dispersed control system because 
in a dispersed ownership system the acquirer does not need to acquire such a high percentage of 
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stock in order to gain control of a company.268 The opposite is true in a concentrated system 
where the company is owned and controlled by a shareholder who holds the vast majority of 
outstanding stock.269 
The individual nations also regulate the fair price.  Article 5 requires that the price be the 
highest paid during the transactions to gain control of the company. 270 Thus, if the acquiror 
raises his bid for some shares, all shareholders must get that same price for their shares. The 
individual nations regulate this by setting the time period for determining the highest price 
offered and in extreme circumstances adjust the price in line with principles of equality, such as 
when something has interfered with what would be valid market prices.271 
The mandatory bid rule does have its ups and downs.  First, the rule provides a gain to 
minority shareholders because they will get the same premium for their stock as was given in the 
control-gaining transaction.272 Further, the rule forces the acquiror to bear the cost of any 
negative effect on the price of the stock caused by the acquiror obtaining the triggering 
percentage.273 Although the theory is that a bidder will not make a bid unless it is efficient to do 
so, the internalization of costs as well as the forced bid requirement, deters bidders from offering 
higher premiums or even trying to gain control in the first place, and thus can result in lost 
market efficiency.274 
This principle of equal price is akin to the “best price rule” under the US Williams Act, 
which requires that the acquiror pay all tendering shareholders the highest price paid for the 
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shares during the tender offer. 275 Article 5, like the Williams Act, protects minority shareholders 
because if the offeror raises his bid, all shareholders, even those that had already tendered get the 
higher price.  Although, the scenario under the Directive is different because its fair price rule 
relates to a mandatory bid procedure, the underlying principle is still the same, the equal 
protection of shareholders. 
 Although the E.U. fair pricing requirement has a counterpart under US law, there is no 
counterpart for the mandatory bid, which proponents argue doesn’t matter too much because the 
mandatory bid rule simply acts as a defensive mechanism by raising the costs of a tender offer.276 
In its best form, the protection and power it offers to an incumbent board does not reach the 
levels of protection offered by US Takeover statutes and would thus add nothing to current US 
takeover defenses.277 
Board Neutrality in Takeovers: Article 9
This Article is the most apparent split between U.S. and E.U. takeover law because it 
prohibits the defensive mechanisms so beloved by U.S. boards of directors.  As we have seen in 
the discussion of U.S. takeover law, the states give the board of directors the power to implement 
defensive tactics at their discretion in almost all circumstances and subject only to limited review 
by the courts.278 The E.U. on the other hand, embracing the efficient market theory and 
mirroring the UK City Code, gives the shareholders the power to decide whether or not to 
implement defensive tactics against takeovers.279 Even thought this article caused the German 
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withdraw of support and the failure of the proposed 13th Directive, the E.U. drafters retained this 
provision. 
 Article 9 requires that member states enact rules prohibiting the use of defensive actions 
to frustrate tender offers from at the latest the time the bid was announced until the result of the 
bid is announced or the bid time lapses.  During this period the board must obtain shareholder 
approval to take action before it can before taking any action other than seeking alternative bids 
which may result in the frustration of the bid and in particular before issuing any shares which 
may result in a lasting impediment to the offeror in obtaining control.280 Here, the member 
states have the ability to extend the period of board neutrality back beyond when the bid was 
announced to the time when the board becomes aware the bid was imminent.281 
This requirement of neutrality rejects not only the U.S. model for granting the board the 
power to act defensively, but also rejects the German model of preauthorization.  First, contrary 
to the US and the developed case law of Unocal and Moran, the E.U. boards are bound under this 
Article to let the shareholders decide the fate of the takeover by voting their proxies.  The board 
cannot take defensive action unless the shareholders give the board specific authorization to do 
so.282 It also rejects use of the poison pill.283 In the U.S., under most state law and in particular 
Delaware, the board can enact defenses even in the face of shareholder disapproval as long as 
that decisions meets the business judgment requirements of Unocal.284 Second, contrary to the 
German law allowing the 18 month renewable authorization given prior to any impending 
takeover effort, this Article requires specific shareholder authorization given during the relevant 
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time period in order for the board to act.285 The policy underlying this requirement is that the 
shareholders should be making the decision to grant authority based upon the relevant 
information and not simply giving blind authorization.  The language of §3 makes this intention 
of informed authorization very clear.286 Decisions made before the beginning of an offer, which 
are not yet fully implemented when an offer is made require shareholder approval to continue if 
they have ability to upset the bid attempt and are not otherwise part of the normal course of 
company business.287 
Even though many U.S. scholars would jump at the chance to enact Article 9 neutrality 
type legislation in the U.S., it is important to note that the idea of board neutrality has different 
consequences in Europe than it would in the U.S.  In Europe, because corporate ownership is 
concentrated in a few shareholders or a shareholder holding enormous blocks of shares, the 
conflict is between controlling and majority shareholders, not management versus shareholders 
like the U.S.288 Essentially, putting control of the defensive tactics in the hands of the 
shareholders in many corporations in Europe would be pointless because that corporation is 
managed by a shareholder who potentially own a majority of the stock and can thus do with the 
defensive tactics as they please.  Further, unlike in the U.S., where management is checked by a 
fiduciary duty to shareholders, there is no equivalent duty for the controlling shareholder to 
protect the minority shareholders.289 The checks available to protect minority shareholders are a 
unification of minority shareholders to overpower a controlling shareholder, and also publicity in 
the sense that the controlling shareholder must publicly announce the use of defensive measures, 
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which will inevitably draw market attention and forces to ensure legitimate use of the defensive 
tactics.290 
The Breakthrough Rule: Article 11
The Breakthrough Rule addresses a different kind of defensive mechanism, namely those 
actions by the corporation to embed its management such as shareholder agreements limiting the 
right to transfer shares, shares with multiple voting rights, and supermajority requirements to 
approve post takeover transactions.291 Essentially, a corporation can defend itself by enacting 
rules regarding who shares can be transferred to or the number of votes that certain shares carry, 
so that they can control the shares or power that a bidder can obtain.  Effectively combating the 
threats Germany saw in these tactics when it rejected the failed 13th Directive, the intent of this 
Article was to limit the ability of management to entrench itself and to equalize the handling of 
these tactics, which vary from country to country, to provide equal treatment across Europe.292 
The U.S. has no equivalent to this Article and in fact, the U.S. state anti-takeover laws act in 
direct conflict with this Article by allowing U.S. companies to enact poison pills.293 
Article 11 renders ineffective any restrictions (contractual or in the articles of 
incorporation) on share transfers or voting rights once a bid has been made public.294 These 
provisions act on two levels.295 First, once a bid is made public, voting rights or transfer 
limitations, such as an agreement to offer shares to other shareholders before offering them to a 
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third party, are null and void for the period of the bid.296 Second, if the bidder gets more than a 
75% controlling stake through the bid, the incumbents or controlling shareholders lose any 
special voting rights or requirements, and the bidder can call a shareholders meeting to revise 
bylaws and elect a new board.297 
This Article exempts Golden Shares and all special rights held by member states in 
companies from this Article as long as they are not overly restrictive on the transfer or movement 
of investment.298 Even though the Directive allows these rights, however, their validity remains 
uncertain. The European Court of Justice has cast doubt on their validity and usefulness and 
requires the nation wishing to use them to show a “precisely tailored scheme” to protect a 
national interest.299 
Opt-Out Provisions and Reciprocity: Article 12
Article 12 is not only the newest addition to the takeover Directive, it is the most 
interesting provision of the EU’s effort to regulate takeovers and attempt to harmonize the laws 
of the many member nations.  In 2002, the Commission introduced Articles 9 and 11, which 
caused heated debate and threatened the new Directive with the same fate as the previous failed 
13th Directive.300 Late in 2003 however, the nations agreed to the “Portuguese Compromise,” 
allowed the enactment of the Directive, but also deteriorated its harmonizing potential.301 Article 
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12 made the Article 9 restrictions on defensive tactics and Articles 11 breakthrough rules 
optional.302 
Essentially, Article 12 allows for three scenarios.303 First, member states can refuse to 
adopt the board neutrality and breakthrough provisions, but then must allow companies with its 
borders to individually opt-in to Articles 9 and 11.304 This situation is much like the one Lucian 
Bebchuk has pushed for in the US.  Simply stated, Bebchuk has proposed an alternative to U.S. 
state regulation whereby the Federal government would set up a system of regulation focused on 
more shareholder power, especially providing a role in defensive tactics, and allow the 
shareholders of a corporation to opt into that system, much like the EU companies are allowed to 
opt into the Directive even if their government does not.305 
The next two scenarios surround the idea of reciprocity, which perhaps act as a check 
against uninhibited protectionism and diversity of law.  Article 12, §3 sets forth this reciprocity 
rule, which states that member states can exempt target companies who apply the defensive 
measure rules and/or the breakthrough rules from the requirements of those rules when they are 
faced with a bidder who does not apply the rules.306 The company, however, must receive 
permission for this exemption from the member state and cannot engage in reciprocity on its own 
volition.307 Under the second scenario, the state would adopt Article 9, Article 11, or both, but 
exempt companies from following the requirements of those Articles when faced with a foreign 
bidder who is not subject to those same requirements because its home jurisdiction did not opt-
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in.308 This leaves the member state with the last two scenarios.  It can opt into the requirements, 
and allow for reciprocity, or it can opt-in to the requirements and not allow reciprocity. 309 
Though, it remains a question, because of international agreements like GATS, whether the 
reciprocity clause can be used against nonmember nations like the U.S.310 
This opt-out provision has lead to the belief that the Directive is a failure in its attempt to 
affect any serious takeover harmonization.  European Commissioner Frits Bolkestein said that 
the Portuguese Compromise took the key ingredient out of the Directive and nullified the EU’s 
hopes of becoming the top world economy.311 Indeed some have argued that this provision is 
likely to increase national protectionism and end the possibility of harmonization.312 However, 
the positive voices say that such pessimism is unwarranted because it overlooks the positive 
elements of the Directive, such as the establishment of a common framework for which to 
legislate from.313 Further, this Directive forces the nations to confront and address these issues 
and to signal a national stance on the critical issue of defensive measures, which can itself help to 
build a more harmonized multinational corporate control system.314 
Implementation: How It Will Play Out Across Europe? 
 So, in the end, Europe is ultimately left with a largely optional system of takeover 
regulation which the member states were required to implement by May 2006.  But how will the 
nations implement the Directive and what effect will the implementation actually have?  It will 
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most certainly take a significant amount of time to see the practical effects of any national 
legislation, especially since only five of the twenty-five nations actually met the implementation 
deadline.315 However, below is the current stance of a few key nations.  From these current 
stances it seems as though the legislation will indeed vary, especially in relation to the optional 
provisions and reciprocity. 
 
The UK:
The UK has already stated that for it, it will be “business as usual,” seeing how most of 
the Directive itself was drawn from their takeover system.316 The UK will opt-in to Article 9, 
which is already law under the City Code, but will most likely opt-out of Article 11 and leave 
open the opportunity for companies to opt-in because it conflicts with market practice of 
allowing irrevocable shareholder agreements not to transfer shares or accept rival offers.317 
Further, the UK will not be allowing reciprocity for Article 9 or 11.318 In terms of Article 5, the 
mandatory bid rule, the UK will set its trigger at 30% of the voting rights and extend the time 
period to determine the fair price to twelve months.319 
France:
France, like the UK, will most likely implement Article 9 §2 and §3, which would create 
more limited use of takeover methods than current French law allows.320 Currently, absolute 
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defenses are prohibited and so is any defense violating the “social interest.”321 However, under 
Article 9, many of the accepted defenses will be void.  In terms of §3, France has already 
changed some its law in order to conform.322 Previously in France, a target board had the 
authority to continue implementation of decisions during a takeover bid, which may frustrate the 
bid, without further shareholder approval.323 However, recently France suspended this authority 
during bid periods, except when, as in line with §3, it is in the ordinary course of business.324 
France, unlike the UK is also likely to allow reciprocity for Article 9.325 
France will opt out of Article 11, except for the breakthrough transfer restrictions in by-
laws during and offer and voting rights caps in by-laws at the first shareholder meeting after a 
successful bid, which were already part of French law.326 It is however unclear if France will 
apply reciprocity to this Article. 
 In respect to Article 5, France is likely to set the mandatory bid trigger at 1/3 of the share 
capital or voting rights and the equitable price time range will be twelve months.327 
Germany:
Germany is unlikely to change much regarding its current takeover law.  It will opt-out of 
Article 9, and leave it open to corporations to opt-in to on their own, however almost none are 
expected to do this.328 
It will also opt out of Article 11.329 Much of the restrictions of Article would have no 
effect in Germany anyway where a lot of what the Article covers is already prohibited.  
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Germany’s only real concern would have been its golden shares in Volkswagen AG, which it 
managed to protect from the regulation because of Article 11’s exclusion of state owned 
shares.330 
Germany will allow reciprocity under Article 9 and 11 and like the UK has set the trigger 
for mandatory bid at 30% of voting rights, but has set the time period for the fair price at 6 
months.331 
IV. Conclusion 
 The U.S. and the E.U. have very different approaches to tender offers, not only in the 
substantive regulations regarding the power dynamic between shareholders and the board of 
directors, but in their overall policy goals and legislative structure.  The U.S. system developed 
out of a competitive federalist system, with the states running the show and the Federal 
government only regulating the procedural elements.  The E.U. on the other hand entered the 
regulation arena with the goal of harmonizing the substantive law of many nations.  Although, 
that effort did not exactly end in a fully harmonized system, it did result in a harmonized 
framework of which to legislate from and build on.  
 There is a lot of debate in the U.S. regarding our current system of board deference in 
respect to defensive measures.  The U.S. allows the boards of directors to implement these 
defensive measures subject almost solely to the check of their own business judgment.  The E.U., 
however, was not willing to accept this same approach.  Their guideline pushes for a neutral 
board and shareholder choice to accept a tender offer or allow the board to enact defensive 
measures.  Many in the US would champion this guideline as model for the U.S. system to 
rebuild on, and perhaps that idea is not such a bad one.  Perhaps, it is time in the U.S. to look 
 
330 Id. 
331 Id. 
55
towards a more shareholder focused approach to tender offers and allow the shareholders an 
unobstructed, undistorted vote on the tender offer.  However, there are also those in the U.S. and 
E.U. alike, especially in Germany, who see the neutral system as a serious danger to corporate 
existence.  
 In the end, we are left with two completely different structures and but the need to still 
work together.  As the May implementation deadline has come and gone, it remains to be seen 
how the E.U. Directive plays out.  Though regardless of what nations implement which 
provisions, the debate regarding tender offers and who gets the ultimate power to decide the 
defensive issue, will continue to rage on. 
